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This paper examines ethical and behavioral aspects of taxpayers, the financial condition of citizens, tax 
fairness, taxpayer services, complexities in the tax regime, tax rates, penalties and enforcement, and tax 
amnesties and the black economy. Primary data were collected by conducting a survey utilizing structured 
printed questionnaires. Secondary data were collected from project reports, government publications and 
documents, books, journals, reports, newspapers and electronic media. Empirical findings suggest that all 
these issues are associated with tax evasion in Bangladesh. We also find that eligibility in a social network 
increases the likelihood that others will take-up. This suggests that taxpayers affect each other’s decisions 
about tax avoidance, highlighting the importance of accounting for social interactions in understanding 
enforcement and tax avoidance behavior, and providing a concrete example of optimization frictions in the 
context of behavioral responses to taxation. The involvement and nexus of the three actors in tax policy 
formulation, implementation and compliance processes were examined. The empirical findings indicate the 
presence of this nexus which facilitates tax evasion. The high magnitude of tax evasion in Bangladesh is 
significantly acknowledged by respondents in the study. The empirical findings suggest that the absence of 
a participatory policy making process, lack of research into, and reform of, the tax system, short-term 
oriented and politically motivated tax policies, loopholes, anomalies and complexities of tax laws and 
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Tax evasion is a significant economic phenomenon. 
Tax evasion is the age-old phenomena which can be 
traced back to the beginning of the human civilization 
(Johnstone & Brown 2004; Torgler 2003; Tanzi & 
Shome 1993; Thakur 1979). It remains a growing 
concern in almost all countries around the world. It is 
no longer the sole problem of any specific society or 
state. Bangladesh, in this context, is no exception. Tax 
evasion plays a significant role in creating and 
maintaining such a nexus. In practice, Bangladesh has 
failed to establish good governance through 
eradicating the maladies of corruption. That 
corruption, rooted deeply in the political, 
administrative and socio-cultural environment of 
Bangladesh, impedes the development process and 
undermines the role of the state. As Zakiuddin and 
Haque (2002) debated, corruption has unfortunately 
been perceived in Bangladesh as a way of life and the 
virtual litany of suspicious dealings, underhand 
agreements, and blatant corruption of the political 
leaders and parties, including both autocratic military 
regimes and democratic regimes, have spread to an all-
pervasive level. 
Tax evasion, therefore, forms an important segment of 
corruption which has been an ongoing issue of concern 
for the government as well as civil society in 
Bangladesh. Although the importance of having an 
effective and efficient tax administration system is 
considered to be integral to any country’s well-being 
(Dietz 2007), the tax administration of Bangladesh is 
considered to be overly bureaucratic, corrupt, 
inefficient and outdated (Khan & Nahar 2011; Mansur 
et al 2011; Rahman & Yasmin 2008; Sarker & 
Kitamura 2002). In addition, it lacks infrastructural 
and logistic support, manpower and an adequate 
rewards and remuneration structure (Mansur & Yunus 
2012). Tax policy formulation as well as tax 
administration in Bangladesh suffers from several 
weaknesses, including the continued use of income tax 
exemptions and the influence of vested groups, both 
from the business community and the tax 
administration system (Mansur et al 2011).  
This paper provide a network model in which 
taxpayers are assumed to have an intrinsic concern for 
consumption relative to that of other local taxpayers 
with whom they are linked on a social network. In this 
regards, taxpayers may seek to evade tax so as to 
improve their standing relative to those they compare 
against. The empirical model exhibits strategic 
complementariness in evasion choices, so that more 
evasion by one taxpayer reinforces other taxpayers’ 
decisions to evade also. Network centrality is a 
concept developed in sociology to quantify the 
influence or power of actors in a network. Bonacich 
(1987) measure counts the number of all paths that 
emanate from a given node, weighted by a decay factor 
that decreases with the length of these paths. In this 
context, our contribution combines sociological and 
economic insights in seeking to understand tax evasion 
behavior. 
In spite of the fact that the model is simple enough to 
admit an analytic solution, it is also sufficiently rich 
that it may be used to address a range of questions of 
interest to academics and practitioners in tax 
authorities. Doing so, this paper focus on two 
questions such as for an arbitrary network structure 
and the value to a tax authority in terms of additional 
revenue raised through audits of knowing the structure 
of social networks. The analysis is performed on a 
class of generative networks that possess many of the 
empirically observed features of social networks, in 
particular allowing for highly visible celebrity 
taxpayers. The major concentrated are the links within 
a social network the greater the value of possessing at 
least some network information. These findings are 
robust to imperfect preference observability. 
Notwithstanding reducing social information to a 
single global statistic known to all taxpayers promotes 
analytical tractability, it is problematic in other 
respects. Believing that taxpayer’s observe aggregate 
information is, in our setting, implicitly the 
assumption that the social network is the complete 
network. Nevertheless there are reasons to think that 
relative consumption externalities are, in fact, 
heterogeneous across individuals. In particular, we 
know that comparators are frequently neighbors, 
colleagues, and friends (Clark & Senik 2010), and 
therefore local in nature. Given the pervasiveness of 
social network and tax evasion in Bangladesh, it can 
be argued that both phenomena require greater 
investigation to ascertain their causes and remedies. 
Despite the importance of this intriguing issue, very 
little empirical research has been conducted on tax 
evasion and social network in Bangladesh. In 
addressing this gap in the literature, this study aims to 
identify and analyze the relationship between tax 




1.1 Research Objectives 
The key objective of this study is to examine the social 
network in the case of tax evasion in Bangladesh, with 
an emphasis on ascertaining the relationship between 
the two phenomena. In this respect, the intention of the 
study is to understand the nature of the problem of tax 
evasion in Bangladesh. 
 
2.0 Literature Review 
Tax evasion is a universal problem (Tanzi & Shome 
1993). It is as old as taxes themselves; however, the 
extent of the problem varies from country to country 
(Torgler 2003; Jain 1987). The phenomenon of tax 
evasion, therefore, has received enormous research 
attention throughout the world. Considerably, over the 
past few decades, a rapid growth in the literature on 
tax evasion and compliance has been evidenced 
(Smatrakalev 2012; Tanzi & Shome 1993; 
Wallschutzky 1984; Yitzhaki 1974; Srinivasan 1973; 
Angell 1938). Consequently, academics, economists, 
and researchers around the world have attempted to 
develop theories and models for, and examine the 
extent, causes, and consequences of, tax evasion. 
Recently, other relevant phenomena, for instance, 
compliance and noncompliance, the shadow economy, 
and the ethical, moral, behavioral and psychological 
aspects of tax evasion have gained scholarly attention. 
Moreover, a large body of research work has been 
conducted in developed and developing countries on 
tax evasion. Thus, reviewing the literature on tax 
evasion will be useful in identifying the common 
features of tax evasion, thereby facilitating the present 
study in creating a platform for analyzing the case of 
tax evasion in Bangladesh. 
During the period of 1970s, the seminal works of 
Allingham and Sandmo (1972), Srinivasan (1973) and 
Yitzhaki (1974) explore special emphasis, since they 
pioneered the models of tax evasion. Allingham and 
Sandmo (1972) have analyzed the impact of the 
probability of detection, penalty rates and tax rates on 
a risk-averse taxpayer’s underreporting decision 
making. They suggest that risk-averse taxpayers will 
be more compliant if the probability of detection and 
penalty for tax evasion are high. Conversely, a high 
tax rate will discourage tax compliance Mannan et al 
2020). Since then, a number of researchers have 
extended and elaborated, as well as questioned, the 
portfolio choice model of tax evasion in analyzing the 
correlation between tax evasion and risk attitudes, 
evasion penalty functions, tax rates, and detection 
(Bayer 2006; Lin & Yang 2001; Clotfelter 1983). 
Moreover, Wallschutzky’s empirical research (1984) 
has explored a number of possible causes that inspire 
taxpayers to evade tax, including high tax rates, a 
government’s unwise use of tax money, rich people’s 
tax avoidance and inequity in the tax system. Alm et 
al (1992) argue that detection and punishment alone 
cannot influence taxpayers’ decisions between 
compliance or non-compliance; rather, a number of 
other variables play an important role.  
In recent years, the behavioral, psychological, and 
demographic analyses of tax evasion have expanded. 
A substantial body of literature has emphasized the 
influence of morality, ethics, religiosity, tax education, 
and culture on the individual decision outcome of tax 
compliance or evasion (Richardson 2008; McGee & 
Cohn 2007). In this context, it can be mentioned here 
that an increasing number of researchers have shown 
interest on examining tax morale in different 
countries. The impact of social norms, values and 
culture cannot be ignored in analyzing the factors of 
tax evasion. Cummings et al. (2009) have reported the 
significant impact of social norms and cultural 
difference on tax evasion and compliance behavior. 
Furthermore, taxpayers’ social and occupational 
identity might influence taxpaying behavior and 
attitudes. In this light, Ashby et al (2009) have found 
a complex relationship between occupational identity 
and taxpaying culture, by using a social identity 
framework in their empirical investigation.  
Taxpayers are certainly members of a society, as well 
as of many different groups. It is, therefore, needless 
to mention that the norms, values, ethics, culture, 
behavior, and attitude of that particular society and 
groups must contribute to their decision about tax 
evasion. Accordingly, demographic variables should 
also be counted as factors in tax evasion. Recently, a 
growing number of scholars are shifting their 
emphasis from the enforcement paradigm to a service 
paradigm (Alm et al 2010). More recently, Alm et al 
(2010) suggest that tax administration should become 
‘kinder, friendlier’, increasing taxpayer services 
together with the presence of detection and 
punishment. Many countries around the world have 
already revised their tax reform strategies.  
The main determinants of shadow economies are tax 
and social security contribution, intensity of 




economy, as Buehn and Schneider (2012) reported. In 
line with theoretical literature, Buehn and Schneider 
(2012) also suggest enhancing enforcement as an 
effective policy tool to deter shadow economy 
activities. Bilotkach (2006) has developed an 
equilibrium model of the game between a businessman 
and a corrupt supervising official in order to explain 
the conditions under which such tax evasion and 
bribery has become rampant in Ukrainian society.  
Rakner and Gloppen (2003; 2002) report that in the 
late 1980s, most African countries faced a series of 
fiscal crises that originated mainly from the crisis of 
governance. The tax evasion issue of African countries 
has attracted considerable research attention (Malkawi 
& Haddad 2009; Julius 2006; Kangave 2005; Gray 
2001).  
In India, Jain (1987) has identified the major causes of 
tax evasion, including a narrow concept of income, a 
complicated tax structure, frequent amendments, 
shortage of personnel, high tax rates, non-levy of 
deterrent penalties, ineffective prosecution machinery, 
lack of awareness among taxpayers, bribery, 
administrative and political corruption, and greed for 
money and power of dishonest businesspeople and 
traders. Gupta (1992) explores that the pervasive 
pursuit of personal gain, political corruption, corrupt 
business practices, weaknesses of the tax system, and 
inefficient and corrupt tax administration are 
responsible for tax evasion in India. As in India, tax 
evasion is a growing problem in Pakistan. According 
to Kemal (2007), the rapid increase of the underground 
economy significantly affects the monetary and fiscal 
policy formulation process of Pakistan. The rise of tax 
evasion in Pakistan is associated with various factors. 
As Kemal (2007) argues, loopholes and the 
complexity of Pakistan tax system facilitate evasion of 
tax.  
Although a number of theories and models have been 
developed and research conducted in order to examine 
the phenomenon of tax evasion of developed, 
developing and transitional economies. Bangladesh 
has unfortunately been left to one side. Only in the last 
decade has internal resource mobilization through 
enhancing income tax collection achieved some 
attention from the government and policy makers. 
However, the tax evasion issue remains far from 
becoming a topic of policy debate and discussion and 
attracting research and academic attention and public 
concern. As a result, the literature on tax evasion in 
Bangladesh is scant in comparison with the severity of 
the problem. Perhaps the most important reason for the 
failure of tax evasion is to gain appropriate importance 
is that a number of policy makers, politicians, 
businesspeople, professionals, public officials, 
celebrities and renowned personalities are involved 
themselves in tax evasion in Bangladesh. 
Few studies (Buehn & Schneider 2012; Hassan 2011; 
Torgler 2004; Schneider 2002) can be found to date on 
the tax morale issue and the size of the shadow 
economy of Bangladesh. Torgler (2004) study has 
demonstrated that tax morale in Bangladesh appeared 
to be highest among Asian countries over the period 
1995-1997 at 96.3%. However, the reasons or 
justifications for such a finding remain unclear. 
Schneider (2002) and Buehn and Schneider (2012), on 
the other hand, have estimated the size of the shadow 
economies around the world over the period from 
1999 to 2007 and have found Bangladesh to have a 
significantly large size of shadow economy, with 
36.0% in 1999 and 35.6% in 2000. Recently, Hassan 
(2011) has conducted empirical research on the 
shadow economy of Bangladesh. The study reports 
that government employees conceal their illegal 
income through money laundering to tax havens or 
countries through their relatives or friends’ bank 
accounts, and through buying plots of land, flats, 
bonds, share certificates, and cars in the name of a 
family member or close relative and friends who do 
not have tax files.  
In the case of Bangladesh, the tax evasion issue, both 
direct and indirect, is virtually overlooked. As 
Chowdhury (1992) has said, any concern about 
evasion in Bangladesh remains unnoticed. It is yet to 
emerge onto the public agenda. In fact, in Bangladesh 
tax evasion remains like a social taboo about which 
nobody likes to speak. Sarker and Kitamura (2002) 
have identified the major problems of the income tax 
system in Bangladesh: its narrow tax base, tax evasion, 
and inadequacies of law and administration. 
According to them, tax evasion in Bangladesh soared 
and severely hampered revenue collection, which 
further exacerbated growth of a parallel black 
economy. The reasons for tax evasion in Bangladesh 
cited by Sarker and Kitamura (2002) were complex tax 
laws, lack of social security, coordination deficits 
among different government agencies and financial 




Furthermore, Rahman et al (2010) have attempted to 
investigate the factors behind the leakage of tax 
revenues in Bangladesh. They pointed to tax evasion, 
lack of awareness, official harassment, complexities of 
tax laws, and lack of social benefit as the major 
reasons for revenues losses. Based on the discussion 
of the available literature, it can, however, be argued 
that tax evasion is obviously a crucial problem for the 
economic progress of Bangladesh. It impedes revenue 
collection, causes corruption, undermines 
administrative efficiency, and encourages the shadow 
economy. Certainly existing research is consistent 
with the argument that the phenomenon of tax evasion 
in Bangladesh should be given more emphasis in order 
to reduce it. However, it will be no exaggeration to say 
that the issue of tax evasion in Bangladesh still lacks 
academic research attention.  
The only literature that has enriched the analysis of 
social information to allow for local comparisons is 
that which uses agent-based simulation techniques as 
an alternative to analytical methods. Models in this 
tradition nonetheless employ representations of social 
networks that appear to differ markedly from real 
world examples. A common property of the network 
structures employed (Hokamp 2014; Bloomquist 
2011) is that the number of taxpayers who observe a 
given taxpayer is fixed, thereby ruling out the 
existence of highly-observed celebrity taxpayers. Yet 
social networks display strong asymmetry in the 
direction of links (Szell & Thurner 2010).  
The study offers a model that is both analytically 
tractable and that allows for local comparisons on an 
arbitrary social network. In this sense, our approach 
lies in the cleavage between existing analytical and 
agent-based approaches, and is complementary to 
each. We perform simulation analysis on a class of 
generative networks that are not subject to the 
restrictions discussed above, and which are utilized 
widely to model network structures in the natural 
sciences. Therefore the importance of conducting an 
exhaustive study on income tax evasion in the context 
of Bangladesh is paramount. Moreover, the 
relationship between tax evasion and social network 
should be examined, since both have a serious impact 
on the politics, bureaucracy and businesses of 
Bangladesh. 
2.1 Theoretical Underpinnings 
Based on the extant literature and relevant theories, 
this study seeks to provide useful insights into 
analyzing social network and tax evasion issue. The 
two phenomena, social network and tax evasion, 
because of their severity and pervasiveness across the 
world, have received considerable research attention. 
These two topics are much discussed in the fields of 
sociology, political science, economics, psychology 
and political economy. Social and behavioral 
scientists, political scientists, economists and policy 
analysts have developed a number of theories and 
approaches to explain and deal with them. A number 
of theories have been developed to explain the policy 
process including pluralism, structuralism, 
institutional theory, rational choice theory, and the 
economic theory of bureaucracy. The economic theory 
of bureaucracy applies the self-interest assumption of 
public officials (Hill 2009). Pluralist theorists argue 
for the equal distribution of power in the decision 
making process (Dahl 1970; 1958). Structuralist 
theorists emphasize class structure (Marx, cited in Hill 
2009) and on the relationship between structure and 
action, whereas institutional theorists stress the role 
and creation of institutions such as the legislature, the 
judiciary, the constitution, and so on (Hill 2009). 
Rational choice theory analyses the policy process 
through economics and to some extent mathematics 
(Hill 2009). 
 
2.1.1 Public Choice Theory 
According to Kemp (1980), Taxes are to be levied, on 
whom, and at what rates are among the most important 
issues any government has to face. Public choice 
theorists have tried to shed light on institutions of 
politics which have a direct relationship with taxation. 
The present study also aims to analyze ‘tax evasion’, 
an important issue for the Bangladesh tax regime, from 
the viewpoints of public choice scholarship. Buchanan 
and Tullock (1965) have proposed the fundamental 
principles of public choice theory by explaining the 
scope of social choice, decision making rules, and the 
economics and ethics of democracy. Public choice 
theory is about the different incentives and processes 
that operate when goods are sought through political 
means rather than through purely economic means. 
The main point is the distribution of costs and benefits. 
The theory explains how individual political decision 
making formulates a policy which conflicts with the 
overall desire of the general public.  
Public choice theorists have contributed significantly 




parliamentarians and bureaucrats in the policy 
formulation and implementation processes and a large 
volume of publications is available linking public 
choice theory to public administration and public 
finance, including tax policy and reforms (Mbaku 
2008; Hettich & Winer 1999; 1997; Boyne 1998). 
Hettich and Winer (1997) state that taxation offers a 
testing ground for public choice theory since a number 
of analytical questions and quantitative data can be 
gathered from taxation. In relation to tax evasion from 
a public choice perspective, Downs (1957) opines that 
‘since every man enjoys the benefits of every 
government act, no matter who pays for it, each man 
is motivated to evade paying himself. In this context, 
the present study seeks to apply public choice theory 
to the tax policy formulation process of Bangladesh in 
order to analyze why and how political actors and 
bureaucrats formulate different tax policies which may 
leave room for tax evasion. 
 
2.1.2 Rent-Seeking Theory 
Rent-seeking theory is an important theory dealing 
with the behavioral patterns and economic rationale of 
individuals or institutions seeking benefits from the 
market. Krueger (1974) contends that competitive 
rent-seeking occurs in a divergence between the 
private and social costs of certain activities, which is 
very much evident in developing countries. Rent-
seeking is an activity that uses resources wastefully to 
increase personal income or personal benefit (Hilman 
2003; Tullock 1984). According to Laband and 
Sophocleus (1988), rent-seeking generates negatively-
valued social product by investing economic resources 
to manipulate redistributive outcomes that favor the 
investor. Tollison (1997) reports that rent-seeking 
refers to socially costly transfers of wealth. Tax 
evasion is a form of rent-seeking since it causes social 
loss through the use of government resources and time 
(Hilman 2003). Ekelund and Tollison (1984) have 
noted that rent-seeking behaviour was observed in the 
early French economy due to the difficulties of tax 
collection and the ease of tax evasion. Palda (2001) 
explains tax evasion through the rent-seeking 
approach, using an example of a firm aiming to evade 
taxes and gain competitive advantage over its rivals. 
In this respect, the present study aims to employ rent-
seeking theory in the tax policy implementation stage 
in Bangladesh. 
   
2.1.3 The A-S Model 
One of the most fundamental contributions to the 
taxation literature is that of Allingham and Sandmo 
(1972) in their theoretical analysis of the individual 
taxpayer’s decision on whether and to what extent to 
evade taxes by deliberately underreporting income. 
They have developed a model in 1972 which is still 
considered a pioneer work in the field of analyzing the 
influence of tax rates and the probability of detection, 
penalty, and punishment on a taxpayer’s decision to 
evade tax. The A-S model has identified two options 
available for an individual taxpayer such as he/she 
may declare his actual income and may declare less 
than his actual income. This study intends to apply the 
A-S model in the case of the tax evasion issue of 
Bangladesh in order to empirically explore the 
perceptions, views and opinions of taxpayers about the 
relation between tax evasion and tax rates, and the 
probability of detection, penalty and punishment. 
 
2.2 Research Ethics 
The study asked for full consent from participants 
where we explained the motivation of study to the 
participated assesses. They had the freedom to leave 
the study at any time or may remain silent to specific 
questions if they were not comfortable. User data was 
anonymized. All our collected data are securely stored 
in a locked drive, and only researchers have access to 
it. 
 
3.0 Research Methodology 
3.1 Theoretical Model 
To understand the way in which social information 
affects the evasion decision. This study do this for an 
arbitrary social network satisfying the conditions in a 
basic property of the model is strategic 
complementarity in evasion choices, an increase in 
evasion by one taxpayer induces others to do likewise. 
This is equivalent to the expected utility of taxpayer t 
being super modular in the cross evasion choice of 
another taxpayer c belonging to t’s reference set: 
Δ2E(Ut)/ΔEtΔEc=at ktc(1-pt f)(1-pc f)>0 ……..(i) 
It can be analyzed how the evasion decision of a 
taxpayer t, Et, is affected by a permanent marginal 
increase in a parameter Pc belonging to a different 
taxpayer t = c. Differentiating the expression for 
evasion in Equation (i) which obtain Equation (ii). 
Under the conditions of Equation (i) it holds at an 




ΔEt/ΔLc=Y1t (Z,1,Δβ/ΔQt)>0;  
ΔEt/Δpc=Y1t[{Z,1,(ΔZ/Δpt)E}+Δβ/Δpt]≤0 …..(ii) 
The results in Equation (ii) underscore that the 
attributes of other taxpayers, and the treatment of other 
taxpayers by the tax authority, both affect own 
compliance. In addition, the impacts are 
heterogeneous across taxpayers, depending upon how 
close taxpayers are in the social network. In respect of 
sign, these results are in line with those of models of 
tax evasion that assume a social norm for compliance, 
albeit there are important differences in economic 
interpretation. 
The first result is that an increase in the income of 
taxpayer t induces taxpayer t to evade more. However 
c gets richer this pushes up their expected 
consumption, causing those taxpayers who observe c’s 
consumption to feel poorer in relative terms. This, in 
turn, induces these taxpayers to increase their evasion 
in an attempt to boost their consumption. This 
behavior, in turn, induces a further set of taxpayers to 
also feel poorer, and also increase their evasion, and 
so on. If the network N is connected then this wave 
effect ultimately reaches every taxpayer in the 
network, so the result in Equation (ii) may be 
strengthened to a strict inequality. If N is not 
connected, however, then there exists at least one 
taxpayer pair {t, c} between whom social information 
does not flow. For such pairs it will hold that ΔEt/ΔLc 
= 0.  
The second result in Equation (ii) is an enforcement 
spillover effect, the evasion of taxpayer t responds 
negatively to the level of tax authority enforcement of 
other taxpayers in the social network. However a 
taxpayer c experiences an increase in audit probability 
they decrease their evasion. This decreases the evasion 
required of taxpayer t to maintain a given level of 
expected relative consumption, leading t to evade less. 
The result can be strengthened to a strict inequality if 
the network Z is connected. This outcome is consistent 
with the empirical literature documenting local 
enforcement spillover effects in networks discussed in 
the introduction. 
This study generate the social network Z following the 
approach of network scientists, who utilize a class of 
network models, known as generative models, to 
investigate complex network formation (Pham et al 
2016). In this modelling paradigm, complex networks 
are generated by means of the incremental addition of 
nodes and edges to a seed network over a sequence of 
time-steps. Two processes governing the node/edge 
dynamics in generative models have been shown to 
generate features consistent with a multitude of social, 
biological, and technological networks (Capocci et al 
2006; Redner 1998). Firstly, the node-degree process, 
makes the probability that each new taxpayer added to 
the network observes an existing taxpayer, t, a positive 
function of t’s degree. Secondly, the node-fitness 
process, makes the probability that a new taxpayer 
added to the network observes an existing taxpayer, t, 
a positive function of t’s fitness. 
By allowing for a role for node-fitness in social 
network formation, we are able to account for the 
observation that, empirically, celebrity taxpayers are 
surely not drawn at random from the distribution of 
income, but rather belong systematically to the upper 
tail. To copy this feature, we equate node-fitness with 
income Lt. We specify the distribution function of Lt 
across taxpayers to satisfy a power law, consistent 
with a large body of empirical evidence (Coelho et al 
2008). In implementation this study generate networks 
of N=421 business individual taxpayers, starting from 
a seed network composed of two interlinked 
taxpayers. Consider a taxpayer t with fitness Lt > 0 and 
degree Δtg at step g of the generative process. We 
entwine the node-degree and node-fitness processes 
by setting the probability that taxpayer t is observed by 
the taxpayer added at step g to be proportional to the 
product LtΔtg0.43 is (Pham et al 2016).  
The taxpayer t incrementally added to the network at 
step g is linked to existing taxpayers according to the 
outcome of five random draws under the probability 
distribution LtΔtg0.43.  However, that these draws are 
with replacement, so a taxpayer may be linked to 
another multiple times. As the model allows for only a 
single, albeit weighted, link between taxpayers, we 
construct the comparison intensity weights to be 
proportional to the frequency of links realized by the 
generative process. Owing to its stochastic nature, any 
single iteration of the generative process may realize a 
Z that is unrepresentative. To mitigate this concern, the 
results we report are averages of multiple independent 
iterations of the generative process. 
Having now described the social network, we specify 
the remaining model functions and parameters. To 
make concrete the vector of predicted income, Lˆ = 
L(d;Z), we specify the tax system as a linear income 
tax, β (Lt) = β Lt, where β ∈ (0, 1), such that E(Lt) = β 




with adjacency matrix AM and weight vector χ with 
elements given by 
AMtc =[{(1-pt f)(1- βpt f)}/εt]ztc  
where εt =(1- β)(1-pt f)2 + β{1+ pt (1- pt)f2}>0 
χtc=[{1+(f-2)ptf}βatdt+bt(1-ptf)]/atεt–{β(1-ptf)∑t∈(1- 
ptf)dt ztc}/ εt 
Then, under the conditions of equation (i), and with a 
linear income tax, the set of incomes L corresponding 
to a set of optimal income declarations d is given by 
L(d;Z) = [I − AM]-1 χ . 
Taxpayers are assumed to know the true average 
probability of audit, p, but do not know how the tax 
authority will select audit targets. Consistent with this 
idea, tax authorities are known to shroud their audit 
selection rules, the so-called DIF score (Alm & 
McKee 2004; Plumley & Steuerle 2004). This study 
set (p, f) to be consistent with a level of evasion of 
10%, as is broadly consistent with the empirical 
evidence for developed countries. 
 
3.2 Data 
The main research area for the study is to examine the 
case of tax evasion in Bangladesh. Therefore, the 
researchers decided to select the sample from 
Bangladesh. The sample location was Dhaka, capital 
of Bangladesh. The reason for selecting Dhaka is that 
Bangladesh is a unitary Republic with central and 
local government. However, central government, 
based in Dhaka city, plays the key role in decision 
making and policy formulation processes. Most 
government organizations are located in Dhaka. In 
addition, the actual revenue collection target for the 
financial year 2017-2018 was set at BDT 87,190 crore 
and BDT 62,340.42 crore was collected, of which 
44.51% was in fifteen zones of Dhaka and it has 
reached a total of 73.22% when the large taxpayers and 
the central survey zone were combined (NBR 2018). 
Moreover, Dhaka is the center of business and 
professional activities in Bangladesh. In this study, to 
examine the tax evasion issue from the viewpoint of 
social network.  
This study is a cross sectional design with quantitative 
approach. The target population of the study is 
individual income taxpayers of the fifteen zones of 
Dhaka. According to the National Board of Revenue 
authority of Dhaka administration, the total individual 
taxpayers 740,925 where self-assessment assesse 
724,063 and general assesse 16,862 were submitted 
annual return during the financial year 2017-2018 
(NBR 2018). This study selects these categories 
because they are required by law to maintain and 
submit books of accounts to the tax authority within 
the stipulated time. The sample is selected by 
following the method of proportional allocation under 
which the sizes of the samples from the different strata 
are kept proportional to the sizes of the strata. For the 
purpose of the study sample size is determined by 
using formula (Krejcie & Morgan 1970): 
s = X2 NP(1-P) / d2 (N-1) + X2 P(1-P) 
Where 
s = required sample size 
X2 =the table value of chi-square for 1 degree of 
freedom at the desired confidence level (3.841) 
N = the population size 
P = the population proportion (assumed to be 0.50 
since this would provide the maximum sample size) 
d = the degree of accuracy expressed as a proportion 
(0.50) 
Therefore sample size is determined to 385 universal 
self-assessment return submitted taxpayers and 
general procedure return submitted 376 to which the 
questionnaire was distributed. This study has followed 
a convenience sampling method. This sampling 
method has also been conducted in the context of 
Malaysia (Ser 2013), the USA and Hong Kong (Chan 
et al 2000). Convenience sampling method has the 
advantage over reliability, time and budget constraint. 
The sample is allocated to each zone according to the 
population weight. The study has used primary data 
collected by using structured questionnaires. The 
survey was conducted during the period of 1st 
December 2019 to 15th February, 2020. The 
questionnaire is composed of closed ended questions 
designed on mostly a Likert scale. Questionnaires 
were delivered to people of various income levels. 
Questions were pre-coded during the survey 
questionnaire, data processing and analysis. The 
quantitative data were subsequently entered into 
STATA for analysis. 
   
4.0 Results and Discussions 
Table 1.1 presents descriptive statistics of 
respondents. In total, 761 respondents filled in the 
questionnaire completely. Standard deviation of the 
age of respondents was 84.82. The respondents were 
aged between 41 to 50 (35.22%), followed by 31 to 40 
(25.22 %), 51–60 (13.27 %), 21 to 30 (10.11%), 61 to 




respondents, male were 83.84% and female 16.16%. 
Almost half of the respondents (49.54%) were 
completed graduate level studies, followed by higher 
secondary level (34.30%), secondary level (14.85%) 
and 4.47 % completed post-graduation, while 11.43 % 
had no formal education. Majority (55.32%) 
respondents were engaged in business, followed by 
private service (14.85%), self-employee (9.72%) and 
public service (2.90%). Around one-third (29.30%) of 
the total respondents had yearly taxable income in 
between BDT 2,50,000 to BDT 4,00,000 followed by 
27.20%,  26.54%, 13.27% and 3.68% of respondents 
whose income were in between respectively BDT 
5,00,001 to 6,00,000, BDT 4,00,001 to 5,00,000, BDT 
6,00,001 to 30,00,000 and BDT 30,00,000 and above.
 
Table 1.1: Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptions Frequency Percentage 
Age   
 21-30 77 10.11 
 31-40 192 25.22 
 41-50 268 35.22 
 51-60 101 13.27 
 61-70 69 9.07 
 71-80 54 7.10 
Standard Deviation  84.82 
Gender   
 Male 638 83.84 
 Female 123 16.16 
Level of education   
 No any formal education 87 11.43 
 Secondary level 113 14.85 
 Higher secondary level 261 34.30 
 Graduation level 377 49.54 
 Post-graduation level 34 4.47 
Employment status   
 Public service 22 2.90 
 Private service 113 14.85 
 Self-employed 74 9.72 
 Business 421 55.32 
Annual level of income   
 2,50,000-4,00,000 223 29.30 
 4,00,001-5,00,000 202 26.54 
 5,00,001-6,00,000 207 27.20 
 6,00,001-30,00,000 101 13.27 
 30,00,000 and above 28 3.68 
Four questions were asked to learn participants’ 
perceptions of the influence of the tax rate, the 
probability of detection, and the audit system on tax 
evasion behavior. Survey results are shown in Table 
1.2. Based on the findings, it can be inferred that 
higher rates of tax, lower rates of penalty, low 
probability of detection and slackness of audit play a 







Table 1.2 Perceptions on the Tax Rate, Penalty and Enforcement 
Statements Agreement/ 
Disagreement 
Employment status (%) 






High rates of income tax are one reason 
for tax evasion  
Strongly Agree 69.90 15.70 6.60 30.90 
Agree 30.10 70.00 87.1 61.10 
Moderately Agree 0.00 0.00 6.30 3.20 
Do Not Agree 0.00 14.30 0.00 4.80 
 Total 100 100 100 100 
Low rates of penalties are responsible 
for causing tax evasion 
Strongly Agree 29.40 0.00 6.10 12.10 
Agree 61.20 35.50 43.20 45.30 
Moderately Agree 9.40 49.80 33.00 29.10 
Do Not Agree 0.00 14.70 17.70 13.50 
 Total 100 100 100 100 
An increase in the probability of 
detection may prevent tax 
Evasion 
Strongly Agree 99.00 15.10 45.90 57.10 
Agree 1.00 49.10 22.10 19.30 
Moderately Agree 0.00 17.10 14.30 20.10 
Do Not Agree 0.00 18.70 0.00 3.50 
 Total 100 100 100 100 
The weakness of the audit system is 
responsible for allowing tax 
Evasion 
Strongly Agree 69.90 32.80 49.10 52.30 
Agree 30.10 67.20 27.60 35.10 
Moderately Agree 0.00 0.00 23.30 12.60 
Do Not Agree 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 Total 100 100 100 100 
According to the employment status, the result shows 
that 69.90% (Public service), 15.70% (private 
service), 6.60% (business) and 30.90% (self-
employed) of respondents strongly perceived that high 
income tax rates were responsible for tax evasion. If 
the score of ‘strongly agree’ and ‘agree’ are collapsed, 
it is shown that majority supported this statement. The 
survey findings tend to be consistent with the findings 
of the interviews. The interviewees expressed their 
opinions about the positive correlation between higher 
tax rates and higher tax evasion. A large of theoretical 
and empirical literature on tax evasion has 
demonstrated a positive relationship between higher 
rates of tax and tax evasion. In Australia, 
Wallschutzky (1984) found that 89.0% of evaders 
perceived tax rates as too high. Bayer (2006) suggests 
that higher tax rates are responsible for more tax 
evasion and wastage of resources, due to the contest 
between the taxman and taxpayers. In the case of 
China, Fisman and Wei (2004) show that a 1% 
increase in the tax rate caused a 3% increase in tax 
evasion.  
In addition to the above Table 1.2 shows that the 
statement ‘low rates of penalties are responsible for 
causing tax evasion’ was strongly supported by 
29.40% (Public service), 6.10% (business) and 
12.10% (self-employed) of respondents. A significant 
61.20% (Public service), 35.50% (private service), 
43.20% (business) and 45.30% (self-employed) 
moderately agreed. A possible interpretation may be 
that the respondents, who were supposed to be the 
taxpayers, downplayed their role, perceiving that if 
they strongly supported the statement, the government 
might increase the penalty rate to deter tax evasion. 
The survey finding has revealed the importance of 
imposing higher penalties to minimize tax evasion. 
Interestingly, in accordance with the Income Tax 
Ordinance, 1984, the lowest amount of penalty is ‘a 
sum not exceeding one hundred taka’ (just over US $1) 
(Section 123.b, Income Tax Manual Part- I, 2009, p. 
239). It can be argued that the rates of penalties in the 
Ordinance are not significant for making tax evaders 
aware of the payment they would need to make for 




the rates of penalty before committing tax evasion. 
Therefore, penalties can be used by tax administrators 
as an instrument for combating tax evasion (Obid 
2004). Low penalty rates will not deter taxpayers from 
evading tax.  
Moreover, a question was asked to learn whether 
respondents perceived that an increase in the 
probability of detection would decrease the level of 
evasion. Above Table 1.2 shows that 99.00% (Public 
service), 15.10% (private service), 45.90% (business) 
and 57.10% (self-employed) strongly agreed. Risk 
aversion is a natural tendency of human beings. In the 
case of tax evasion, the risk-averse taxpayer will also 
calculate all possible risks in evading taxes. Thus, the 
probability of detection may be of one of the most 
crucial risks for a tax evader. If the evader knows that 
there is strong possibility of being detected, he/she 
might be wary of underreporting income. Besides, if 
there is sufficient reason for an individual to believe 
that he/she will not be detected evading tax, self-utility 
maximization psychology will lead to evasion. This 
findings of the study are consistent with the basic tenet 
of the A-S model such as the higher the probability of 
detection, the larger the income taxpayers will declare 
(Allingham & Sandmo 1972). Risk-averse taxpayers 
will be conscious of the consequences of evasion if the 
tax administration is efficient enough to detect and 
monitor underreporting of income.  
Furthermore, the weaknesses of the audit system were 
strongly indicated by 69.90% (Public service), 32.80% 
(private service), 49.10% (business) and 52.30% (self-
employed) of respondents as a reason for allowing tax 
evasion in Bangladesh to occur. Moreover, 30.10% 
(Public service), 67.20% (private service), 27.60% 
(business) and 35.10% (self-employed) agreed with 
the statement and 23.30% (business) and 12.60% (self-
employed) moderately agreed. None disagreed. The 
audit system of the tax administration in developing 
countries is not free from weaknesses which might be 
contributors to the underground economy. As 
Friedman et al. (2000) point out that weaknesses in the 
legal system encourage the underground economy to 
flourish.  
The empirical findings shows the differences in 
perceptions of the four groups of respondents in 
relation to the impact of tax rate, probability of 
detection, penalty, audit on tax evasion. It can be seen 
that professional subgroup appeared to be more 
strongly supportive. Overall, based on the findings of 
the survey, interviews and the literature, it can be 
assumed that high tax rates, low rates of penalties and 
a weak audit  system encourage tax evasion in 
Bangladesh. 
Before the regression discontinuity analyses, we focus 
on observations around the 10% threshold. This is a 
potential threat to the continuity of characteristics of 
the underlying population and, thus, a possible threat 
to a practical implementation of regression 
discontinuity approach that requires the outcome is 
smooth in the neighborhood of the threshold. It is 
indeed possible that observations are bunched at these 
selected points are not similar to the neighboring ones. 
It is likely to be correlated with many characteristics 
of individuals. However, for the regression 
discontinuity analysis, we exclude exact fractional 
observations from the sample of analysis. For the 
network analyses, it also need to restrict the sample 
further to operationalize the family network variable, 
and to ensure that the assumptions of the regression 
discontinuity design are not violated by family 
members. 
Now, we turn to the network level analysis by 
analyzing adoption of an individual. We focus on 
network members who fall into subsamples in which 
we showed evidence of a discontinuity in adoption: we 
exclude network members with fractional shares, and 
further zoom in on those receiving capital income and 
in firms with large number of shares. We do not 
impose any additional restrictions on individuals 
themselves—the running variable is the property of 
the network member and he/she may affect family 
members regardless of their characteristics. 
Further, we want to make sure that when we compare 
individuals with network members on either side of 
the 10% threshold, this is the only difference between 
those groups. It shows that as the network member’s 
share is crossing 10%, the share owned by the 
individual itself is more likely to be above 10% as 
well. It turns out that this is driven by family members 
owning identical number of shares. Thus, in what 
follows, we restrict attention to network links between 
individuals who do not own shares. In addition, it 
shows, in that subsample the likelihood of having a 
share above 10% sails smoothly through the threshold. 
We restrict attention to this subsample in what follows. 
Beside the necessity of exploiting discontinuity for 




network links between individuals who do not own 
shares in the same firm also has economic content.  
Figure 1.1 shows the discontinuity-based evidence of 
adoption elsewhere in the network on individual 
adoption, and the top panel of Table 1.3 shows the 
corresponding estimates. The estimates of the 
discontinuity are generally significant and reasonably 
stable as the window around 10% is adjusted. The 
result also shows the number of unique treating 
network members that underlie each specification—
there are about half as many of them as all the 
observations. The large of the difference is explained 
by the same network member treating multiple 
individuals in the network. 
 
Figure 1.1 Family member’s ownership share and ultimate adoption of the firm 
Notwithstanding, the network effect may be present 
regardless of one’s own ownership, individuals who 
already own at least 10% are already eligible for any 
additional arrangements and thus may be more 
strongly affected. At the same time simultaneously, by 
the virtue of their eligibility, they are more likely to set 
up a firm regardless, so that the additional network 
incentive might be expected to be weaker for that 
reason. However, the second panel shows robustness 
of the results to inclusion of demographic controls—
they are essentially unaffected. Overall, we observe 
that the estimated effect of a network member being 
eligible in Table 1.3 is roughly similar in magnitude to 
the effect of the individual herself being eligible. It 
explores that the large network effect relative to own 
effect is consistent with either interactions being 
strong or else low awareness of sheltering 


















Table 1.3 The effect of crossing 10% ownership by a family network member 
Description Everyone Minimum 10% Share 
 No Control Flexible No Control Flexible 
Age     
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Level of education     








































Annual level of income     








































We further split the sample by whether the network 
member received dividends in past. The bottom two 
panels of Table 1.3 show that for those with family 
members who received dividends, the effects are of the 
expected sign and not too sensitive to the size of the 
window or inclusion of controls. They are becoming 
significant when the window around the threshold 




included. The outcomes for those with family 
members who have not received dividends are smaller 
and generally insignificant. This is consistent with the 
interpretation of take-up by a family member 
reflecting the presence of the treatment, since the 
direct effect on take-up for that group was not 
detectable, observing an impact on their family 
members would be surprising. 
In Table 1.4 we split the sample in additional ways. 
The impact of own eligibility was strong and the 
corresponding outputs are strong here as well. 
Thereafter, we split the sample by whether the treated 
individual itself received dividends in the past. This 
study find more precise statistical evidence for those 
who did not receive dividends themselves than for 
those who did, though the large standard errors do not 
allow for rejecting the possibility that point estimates 
are not statistically different. Nevertheless, even if the 
coefficients for those without dividends were similar 
in absolute value, the base take-up for this group is 
much lower and thus the effect is economically much 
more significant. Hence, a very rough taxonomy of the 
results may be that treating individuals with most to 
gain are most responsive to the 10% threshold 
incentive, but they stimulate take-up by individuals 
who have less potential to gain and so probably least 
informed otherwise.
 
Table 1.4 The effect of crossing 10% ownership by a family network member on take-up decomposition of response 
Description Everyone Minimum 10% Share 
 No Control Flexible No Control Flexible 
Age     
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As the public choice theorists argue that human beings 
are basically rational utility maximizers. Based on the 
core concepts of public choice theory, it can be argued 
that politicians, bureaucrats, and businesspeople are 
self-interested individuals who strive for their own 
private goals and ambitions. In this regards, an attempt 
was made to test the applicability of public choice 
theory to the tax policy formulation of Bangladesh, 
focusing on the self-seeking nature of human being. 
The findings are consistent with the arguments of 
public choice theory. Trends in the tax policy 
formulation process and in some tax policies pointed 
to the self-interested behavior of policy makers. The 
desire for personal financial gain by tax officials 
enhances opportunities for rent-seeking (Lambsdorff 
2002). Dishonest taxpayers, including businesspeople, 
professionals, and self-employed people, negotiate 
with corrupt tax officials to reduce or to avoid the legal 
obligation of tax payment. Thus, the connivance of 
taxpayers and tax officials in tax policy 
implementation facilitates each to earn ‘the above 
normal profits described as rents’ (Khan 1996). As a 
consequence of the rent-seeking of tax authorities and 
taxpayers, the Bangladesh government fails to collect 
proper income taxes from potential taxpayers. Thus, it 
can be argued that the opportunity cost of this rent-
seeking leads to the continuous budget deficit of 
Bangladesh. 
The primitive argument of the A-S model is that tax 
evasion will decrease with increases in penalty and the 
probability of detection (Allingham & Sandmo 1972). 
The survey results were consistent with the A-S 
model. In the context of the A-S model, it can be 
argued that, if an increase in the penalty decreases tax 
evasion, then, conversely, a low rate of penalty will 
increase tax evasion. An interpretation for the less 
strong support for the statement may be that, in the 
context of Bangladesh, the imposition of a penalty for 
tax evasion has not yet been widely practiced. 
Therefore, participants perhaps tended to not perceive 
significant influence in low rates of penalty on tax 
evasion. Other explanation may be that the 
respondents tended to not strongly recognize the 
relationship between low rates of penalties and tax 
evasion to avoid the possibility of increasing penalty 
rates by policy makers as a deterrent to tax evasion. 
Finally, a set of theories, public choice, rent-seeking, 
and the A-S Model, were shown in the framework for 
analyzing tax evasion and social network. The 
empirical findings of tax policy formulation, its 
implementation and compliance processes were 
consistent with the core arguments of these theories as 
applied respectively to each process. 
 
5.0 Conclusion  
The findings of the study demonstrated numerous 
issues in the tax policy implementation process that 
are associated with tax evasion. In this paper we apply 
to tax evasion recent advances in network theory and 
a large literature on the role in individual decision-
making of social comparison. Our key theoretical 
advance is to demonstrate a link between network 
centrality on a social network and tax evasion. Our 
modelling allows for local consumption comparisons 
and utilizes networks that have the properties of 
observed social networks. Given that tax authorities 
are now investing in technology that seeks to construct 
social networks, the study shows that network 
information can allow a tax authority to better predict 
the likely revenue benefits from conducting an audit of 
a particular taxpayer. In particular, for a tax authority 
that is largely ignorant of the social network, we 
document strong initial revenue gains from acquiring 
relatively small amounts of network information. The 
basic model we have presented here offers much scope 
for future research. The article suggests three avenues. 
Firstly, it would be of interest to introduce dynamic 
features to the model that relate behavior today to past 
reporting decisions and audit outcomes. Secondly, 
while we have focused on tax evasion, early empirical 
work suggests the relevance of a similar modelling 
approach to tax avoidance behavior, or indeed 
criminal activity more generally. Thirdly, as we have 
assumed income to be exogenously determined, it 
would be of interest to introduce formally a labor-
supply decision. 
In the tax policy formulation process, the empirical 
data revealed the lack of comprehensive research on 
the flaws of the tax system and how to overcome them, 
the lack of specialized knowledge on the part of some 
policy makers, the importance of comparing 
Bangladeshi tax policies with the tax policies of 
developing and developed countries, and the 
importance of a reform of the Income Tax Ordinance 
1984. It is evident in the empirical findings that 
shortcomings of income tax laws and policies, such as 
the absence of a clear definition of tax evasion, 




changes in tax-related documents, and repeated 
promulgation of tax amnesties are responsible for 
facilitating tax evasion. It is to be noted that the policy 
implementation process plays the crucial role in 
implementing tax policies as well as collecting 
revenues. If there remains weaknesses and flaws in the 
implementation process, the taxpayers will tend to 
exploit such leakages. 
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QUESTIONNAIRE 
Surveyor ID:                                        Participation number:                                        Date: 
Assessment type:           General                                                           Self-assessment 
SL Description   
1. Gender Male  Female 
2. Age   
3. Marital status   
 Single Married Divorced Widowed 
4. What was the last grade of school you completed? 
 No any formal 
education 
SSC  HSC Graduation level Post-graduation level 
5. Could you please describe your profession? 
 Professional Business Private service Public service Self-employed 
6. Please tell me for the following statement whether you think it can always be justified, never be justified, or something in 
between: Cheating on tax if you have the chance 
 Never Sometimes Always Probably 
7. Trading or exchanging goods or services with a friend or neighbor and not reporting it on your tax 
form 
YES NO 
8. Reporting your main income fully, but not including some small outside income YES NO 
9. Being paid in cash for a job and then not reporting it on your tax form  YES NO 
10. Not reporting some earnings from investments or interest that the government would not be able to 
find out about 
YES NO 
11. Do you feel it is wrong or not wrong if a taxpayer does not report all of his or her income in order to pay less income 
taxes?  
Not wrong A bit wrong Wrong Seriously wrong 
12. Within the past five years or so, do you think you might have left some reportable income off your tax return – even, just a 
minor amount?   
definitely have not definitely have May be May be not 
13. What was the highest tax rate level for the last financial year? 
10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 
14. Could you tell me how much confidence you have in the legal system? 
a greatly  quite a lot of not very much none at all 
15. Public officials can usually be trusted to do what’s right? 
strongly agree mildly agree mildly disagree strongly disagree 
16. Could you tell me how much confidence you have in the government in your capital? 
a greatly  quite a lot of not very much none at all 
17. How much confidence do you have in courts system? 
a greatly  quite a lot of not very much none at all 
18. Could you tell me how much confidence you have in the legal system? 
a greatly  quite a lot of not very much none at all 
19. Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people? 
Most people can be trusted Can't be too careful 
20. Would you say that having a democratic political system is a very good? 
Fairly good Fairly bad Very bad Way of governing 
21. Democracy may have problems but it’s better than any other form of government? 
Strongly agree Mildly agree Mildly disagree Strongly disagree 
22. How satisfied are you with the way the people now in national office are handling the country’s affairs? 
Fully satisfied  Fairly satisfied Fairly dissatisfied Very dissatisfied 
23. Would you please put mark the political system as it is today? 
Very good Fairly good Fairly bad Very bad 
24. How satisfied are you with the financial situation of your household? 
Fully satisfied Fairly satisfied Fairly dissatisfied Very dissatisfied 
25. Could you tell me if recently you have known someone or have heard someone you know comment 
about somebody who has: Managed to avoid paying all his tax  
YES NO 
26. Would you say that a person in our country who has committed an illegal act gets caught? 
is very possible fairly possible a little possible not at all possible 
 
Page 32 of 20 
27. Could you please rank the NBR in regards to the processing returns? 
Excellent pretty good only fair poor 
28. Could you please rank the NBR in regards to the issuing refunds? 
Excellent pretty good only fair poor 
29. Could you please rank the NBR in regards to the answering questions? 
Excellent pretty good only fair poor 
30. Could you please rank the NBR in regards to the auditing returns? 
Excellent pretty good only fair poor 
31. Could you please rank the NBR in regards to the collecting taxes due? 
Excellent pretty good only fair poor 
32. The NBR employees are honest – you could never bribe them. 
Strongly agree Mildly agree Mildly disagree Strongly disagree 
33. NBR employees are just as knowledgeable as any private tax expert. 
Strongly agree Mildly agree Mildly disagree Strongly disagree 
34. I am confident that the NBR would never try to take more money from me than they should. 
Strongly agree Mildly agree Mildly disagree Strongly disagree 
35. You can depend on the IRS to keep accurate tax records. 
Strongly agree Mildly agree Mildly disagree Strongly disagree 
36. NBR procedures and practices are fair and reasonable ones that respect the rights of taxpayers. 
Strongly agree Mildly agree Mildly disagree Strongly disagree 
37 How do you feel about the government income tax system as it applies to the tax return – do you feel it is?   
quite fair reasonably fair somewhat unfair quite unfair 
38. The present tax system benefits the rich and is unfair to the ordinary working man or woman. 
 Strongly agree Mildly agree Mildly disagree Strongly disagree 
39. Do you ever talk about NBR and its activities with your family? YES NO 
40. Do you ever talk about NBR and its activities with your friends and co-workers? YES NO 
41. What is the minimum fine for tax evasion in your jurisdiction?  YES NO 
42. What is the maximum fine for tax evasion in your jurisdiction? YES NO 
43. Do you apply the criminal code in the case of tax fraud? YES NO 
44. Is there a monetary fine in the case of tax fraud? YES NO 
45. Do you treat tax fraud in the same way as tax evasion? YES NO 
46. How much attention did you pay to discussions on the media about NBR and its activities? 
A lot Quite a bit Some Very little  No attention 
47. How proud are you to be a taxpayer? 
 Not at all proud Not very proud Quite proud Very proud 
48. May I know your annual 
level of taxable income for 
the current financial year 
2017-2018? 
   
BDT 2,50,000-4,00,000  
BDT 4,00,001-5,00,000  
BDT 5,00,001-6,00,000  
BDT 6,00,001-30,00,000  
BDT 30,00,000 and above 






 High rates of income tax are one reason for tax evasion     
 Low rates of penalties are responsible for causing tax 
evasion 
    
 An increase in the probability of detection may prevent tax 
evasion 
    
 The weakness of the audit system is responsible for 
allowing tax evasion 
    
       
 
